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ATTEMPTS TOWARDS A ZERO-SUM GAME: A
RECURRING IMBALANCE BETWEEN
INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
Christopher N. Netniss*
The digital era we live in today allows society to work, shop, socialize,
and even monitor one’s health without having to leave the confines of one’s
home. In a recent landmark privacy case, Carpenter v. United States, the
individual privacy implications of the Fourth Amendment were strengthened
when the Supreme Court held that the government must generally obtain a
warrant before collecting more than six days of historical cell-site location
information from a third-party service provider, like Verizon. Cell-site location information could implicate numerous Fourth Amendment concepts,
such as the third-party doctrine, mosaic theory, and public exposure doctrine.
Refusing to apply the third-party doctrine in its existing state, the Supreme
Court advanced an alternative digital third-party doctrine to protect historical
cell-site location information.
Recognizing the technological advances and the ubiquitous use of technology by society, the Court’s decision attempts to balance the playing field
between individual privacy and law enforcement. This Article explores the
Supreme Court’s selective valuation of privacy in physical and digital information. In doing so, this Article argues that a digital third-party doctrine will
not resolve the tension between the Fourth Amendment and technology, as
it is a direct departure from traditional expectations and proves unworkable.
What will prove workable, however, is adhering to the common understanding that what enters the public—either through physical or digital information—remains public knowledge, and that which is public knowledge
does not amount to a reasonable expectation of privacy.
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. The author would like to first
thank his parents for their unconditional love and endless wisdom. The author would also like to
thank his advisor, Professor Marcy Strauss, whose insight and feedback improved this piece immeasurably, and his student Note advisors for providing feedback and encouragement no matter
the time of day. Finally, the author would like to express his gratitude to his team at the Loyola of
Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review for the honor of working with them.
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How much are you willing to give up for your privacy? Are you
willing to forego social media? Are you willing to limit your
conversations with family and friends to in-person only? Are you
willing to operate your own personal banking system at home
instead of using a conventional banking method? Are you willing
to disconnect your cell phone each time you travel outside the
confines of your home? Are you willing to physically travel to a
convenience store to inquire about a product instead of using your
electronics to browse their website online?

I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine having the sudden urge to watch a baseball game at Dodger
Stadium in Los Angeles, California. Using your cell phone, you start researching when the next Dodger game is. You find out the Dodgers have a
home game that night, so you scour the Internet for tickets, visiting site after
site for the best bargain. You end up finding the right seat at the right price,
prompting you to pull out your banking debit card to finalize the purchase.
An e-mail confirmation is then sent to you, and you begin making your way
to Dodger Stadium. Along the way, you get hungry. You stop at a local
restaurant, purchase food with your debit card, then continue on your way to
the stadium. You get to the stadium, and in order to enter the stadium, you
show security the e-mail confirmation from your phone. Once inside the
stadium, you purchase drinks and a Dodger hat using your debit card. Excited, you share photos of yourself at the stadium on Facebook. After the
game, you use a navigational app on your phone, Waze, to help get you home
faster. Finally, you arrive home, satisfied that you acted on your idea to
watch a baseball game. Unfortunately for you, what began as an idea in
attending a baseball game is now a lasting digital trail of your physical
whereabouts. And until recently, you lacked an expectation of privacy in
your personal information that law enforcement wants to collect from your
journey to Dodger Stadium. That may have changed in Carpenter v. United
States (“Carpenter”).1
In Carpenter, a recent landmark privacy case, the individual privacy
implications of the Fourth Amendment were strengthened when the United
States Supreme Court held that the government must generally obtain a warrant in order to collect historical cell-site location information (CSLI) from

1. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
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a third-party service provider.2 Using the example above, each time the
Dodger fan’s cell phone was near a cell tower, a signal would transmit to the
cell tower generating an approximate location of the cell phone, and the location history of the cell phone would then be documented and stored by a
third-party service provider.3 If, a week later, law enforcement approaches
Verizon, a third-party service provider, with a subpoena requesting the location information generated by the Dodger fan’s cell phone, the Supreme
Court’s holding in Carpenter may give the Dodger fan a legitimate expectation of privacy in the location information that was generated.4 The same
could not be said if law enforcement went to the Dodger fan’s bank with a
subpoena and requested the fan’s bank records, detailing the fan’s transactional history.5 While the fan may have a privacy interest in the location
information generated by the cell towers, the fan has no privacy interest in
the bank records.6
The Fourth Amendment,7 originally enacted to protect against trespass
in the home by law enforcement, today also safeguards digital data from being obtained by law enforcement. The market for technology and the “seismic shifts in digital technology” cause a recurring imbalance between individual privacy and the Fourth Amendment.8 This Article explores the
privacy implications of both digital data and physical information, and explains the similarities and differences of the privacy interests between the

2. Id. at 2221 (holding that “the Government must generally obtain a warrant supported by
probable cause before acquiring” historical cell-site location information from third-party providers).
3. See, e.g., State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 636–37 (N.J. 2013) (explaining how cell-site location information is generated).
4. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221 (holding that “the Government must generally obtain a
warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring” historical cell-site location information
from third party providers).
5. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444 (1976) (holding that “the issuance of a subpoena to a third party to obtain the records of that party does not violate the rights” of an individual).
6. Id.; Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
8. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219.
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two. In doing so, this Article explores numerous Fourth Amendment concepts such as the third-party doctrine (TPD), the mosaic theory, and the public exposure doctrine (PED).
Part II of this Article describes the legal background of the Fourth
Amendment and the background from which Carpenter draws its authority.
Part III examines the Carpenter decision. Part IV explains the implications
of obtaining digital data and physical information, and why the third-party
doctrine proves unworkable, especially considering that today’s physical information is increasingly digitized. Part V discusses the impracticability of
factoring length of surveillance into the reasonable expectations of privacy
analysis. Finally, Part VI concludes this Article by advocating that both the
third-party doctrine and the mosaic theory should be rejected, while adhering
to the common understanding that public knowledge does not amount to a
legitimate expectation of privacy when it enters the public eye.

II. BACKGROUND OF THE LEGAL STANDARD
The ratification of the Fourth Amendment was a direct departure from
the once-utilized “Writs of Assistance.”9 These general, non-specific warrants had arbitrary roots, which carved the path for the Fourth Amendment.10
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence protects individuals from being subject to
an unreasonable search or seizure by the government.11 As the first clause
of the Fourth Amendment guards against “unreasonable” searches or seizures, reasonableness has been coined the “fundamental command” of the
Fourth Amendment.12 This “imprecise and flexible term” reflects the framers’ recognition “that searches and seizures were too valuable to law enforcement to prohibit them entirely,” and instead “should be slowed down.”13
9. James Otis, Against Writs of Assistance, CONST. SOC’Y (Feb. 24, 1761),
https://www.constitution.org/bor/otis_against_writs.htm [https://perma.cc/PQG2-W4Z5].
10. See, e.g., Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481–82 (1965) (expressing that “the Fourth
Amendment was most immediately the product of contemporary revulsion against a regime of writs
of assistance . . . .”).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment’s plain text affords “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures,” such that “no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
12. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).
13. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 75 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
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While the expectations of society helped create the Fourth Amendment, the
expectations of society continues, for better or worse, to alter the protections
of the Fourth Amendment. Today’s example is the booming nature of technology.

A. Search: Differentiating Between its Conventional and
Constitutional Use
Before delving into the many legal canons that are connected to the
Fourth Amendment, it is important to differentiate between a Fourth Amendment “search,” and the conventional everyday use of the word. While we all
may have searched the couch for our misplaced car keys, the remote to the
television, or even a shoe that our dog might have hidden, a Fourth Amendment “search” has a different meaning.14
A modern Fourth Amendment “search” is driven by two separate
tests—both of which—individuals can assert. The first is the common-law
trespass test invoked in United States v. Jones (“Jones”), which guards
against the warrantless and physical intrusion of private property by law enforcement “for the purpose of obtaining information.”15 The second test,
which this Article primarily focuses on, was invoked in Katz v. United States
(“Katz”).16 In Katz, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of an
electronic listening and recording device attached to a public telephone booth
by the government without a warrant.17 Both Katz and the government argued the constitutionality of the public telephone booth in terms of a property
interest,18 but the Court was instead concerned with individual privacy.19
The government argued that Katz entered a public telephone booth that was
14. See generally Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the
Fourth Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979 (2011) (explaining the structure and evolution of the Fourth
Amendment).
15. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012) (holding that “the Government’s
installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s
movements, constitutes a ‘search.’”).
16. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); Jones, 565
U.S. at 408–09 (“[T]he Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”).
17. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348, 354–56.
18. Id. at 351.
19. Id. at 351–52.

NETNISS (DO NOT DELETE)

6

12/4/19 11:11 AM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:1

constructed out of glass, allowing any passerby, including a government official, to observe Katz.20 The Court agreed with the government insofar as
“[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”21 But the Court
disagreed that this rule is absolute.22 The Court explained that when Katz
entered the public telephone booth, closed the door behind him, paid the
price to make a phone call, and only spoke loud enough for the recipient of
the call to hear him, Katz sought to exclude the “uninvited ear,” not the “intruding eye.”23 For this reason, Katz had an expectation that “the words he
utters” would remain private,24 and because the government did not obtain a
warrant prior to recording Katz’ conversation,25 the government violated
Katz’ Fourth Amendment privacy right.26 As Katz successfully did, individuals can invoke the protections of the Fourth Amendment by demonstrating
an “actual (subjective) expectation of privacy” that society recognizes as reasonable.27 This two-part test encompasses a subjective and objective prong,
but courts tend to place much more weight on the objective prong.28 The
Supreme Court has emphasized that the reasonable expectations of privacy

20. Id. at 352.
21. Id. at 351.
22. See, e.g., id. at 352 (explaining that Katz “did not shed his right to [privacy] . . . simply
because he made his calls from a place where he might be seen.”).
23. See id. at 352.
24. Id. (noting that Katz had an expectation “that the words he utters into the mouthpiece
will not be broadcast to the world.”); id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
25. Id. at 354–57 (majority opinion); id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 358–59 (majority opinion).
27. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurrence).
28. See generally Orin S. Kerr, Katz Only Has One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective
Expectations, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 113 (2015) (statistically analyzing how a large majority of courts
consider and decide cases with little-to-no assessment of the subjective prong); see also Orin S.
Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1037 (2010) [hereinafter Fourth Amendment & the Internet] (expressing that “the phrase ‘reasonable expectation of
privacy’ is essentially a legal fiction that masks a normative inquiry into whether a particular law
enforcement technique should be regulated by the Fourth Amendment.”).
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test asserted in Katz is subject to certain exceptions, like the third-party doctrine and the public exposure doctrine.29

B. Third-Party Doctrine (TPD): Traditional Rule
The third-party doctrine originated in United States v. Miller30 and was
reinforced in Smith v. Maryland,31 where the Supreme Court established that
individuals lack any legitimate expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.32 For example, suppose Will enters a bank,
creates an account, and later makes purchases using a debit card that was
issued to him from his bank. In this example, the bank is the third party, and
all of Will’s transactions serve as information that Will voluntarily shares
with the bank. If the government sought to obtain a hard copy of Will’s
transactional history from the bank, Will has no privacy interest in those
bank records despite the records being a summary of when, where, and how
Will used his money. The reason for Will’s lack of privacy interest is simple,
yet difficult to accept. When individuals voluntarily convey information to
third parties, it is presumed that they assume the risk that the third party will
then disclose that information to the government.33 Even if an individual is
unaware that his information is being documented and stored by a third party,
the application of the traditional third-party doctrine does not change because the traditional rule does not cater to the “least-sophisticated” consumer.34 Although the presumption that individuals assume the risk remains

29. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasizing the two-prong privacy
test is “subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”).
30. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018) (explaining that the “third
party doctrine largely traces its roots to” United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)).
31. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–44 (1979).
32. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976). For a detailed analysis of the
third-party doctrine, see generally Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH.
L. REV. 561 (2009) [hereinafter Third-Party Doctrine] (exploring the third-party doctrine).
33. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443; see also Smith, 442 U.S. at 745.
34. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 887 (6th Cir. 2016); see Smith, 442 U.S. at
742; see also Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (emphasizing that the lack of privacy interest remains true
“even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose.”).
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true under the traditional third-party doctrine,35 there are circumstances
where courts do assess the content of information.

1. Content Information Versus Non-Content Information
When analyzing the third-party doctrine, courts often assess whether
the information voluntarily shared contains content information or non-content information.36 Content information is the actual “contents of communications,”37 such as the typed message in an email or text message,38 or the
written message on a letter that is sealed inside an envelope.39 These type of
communications often reveal an individual’s personal and private thoughts.40
The Supreme Court and its progeny have held that individuals have an expectation of privacy in content information—and as a result, the government
must generally obtain a warrant supported by probable cause in order to obtain content information.41 Non-content information, however, is the out-

35. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443; see also Smith, 442 U.S. at 745.
36. See generally Fourth Amendment & the Internet, supra note 28 (explaining the distinction between content information and non-content information, and how courts assess the two).
37. Smith, 442 U.S. at 741.
38. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that individuals
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of their emails); City of Ontario v. Quon,
560 U.S. 746, 754–55 (2010) (discussing the expectations of privacy in the content of text messages).
39. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878) (holding that “[l]etters and sealed packages
of this kind in the mail are as fully guarded from examination and inspection, except as to their
outward form and weight, as if they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own
domiciles.”).
40. Fourth Amendment & the Internet, supra note 28, at 1020–22.
41. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733 (“The constitutional guaranty of the right of the people
to be secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus
closed against inspection, wherever they may be. Whilst in the mail, they can only be opened and
examined under like warrant, issued upon similar oath or affirmation, particularly describing the
thing to be seized, as is required when papers are subjected to search in one’s own household.”);
see also Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288 (holding that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of their emails).
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ward information necessary to establish communication, such as a recipient’s address on an envelope.42 Because non-content information is information that is shared with third parties, like the postal office when a letter is
mailed, the government does not need a warrant supported by probable cause
to obtain the non-content information contained on the envelope.43
Courts have also analyzed content information and non-content information in e-mail communications.44 Although lower courts have instructed
that the actual content of e-mail communications is protected,45 the Supreme
Court has made clear that digital communication is not completely immune
from being obtained and read without a warrant.46 At the same time, if the
same communication is written on paper, placed in an envelope, sealed, and
placed in the mail for delivery, then the letter carries with it the full protection of the Fourth Amendment.47 The implications of digital and physical
information lead to a recurring issue: different forms of communication carry
different constitutional protections despite containing the same information.

42. See, e.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at 741 (explaining that a pen register does not reveal the
content of a phone call, but the phone numbers dialed as “a means of establishing communication.”); see also Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733 (holding that “[l]etters and sealed packages of
this kind in the mail are as fully guarded from examination and inspection, except as to their outward form and weight, as if they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles.”).
43. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 741.
44. See, e.g., Warshak, 631 F.3d at 285–88.
45. See, e.g., Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288 (holding that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of their emails).
46. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 762 (2010) (emphasizing that “[e]ven if he
could assume some level of privacy would inhere in his messages, it would not have been reasonable for Quon to conclude that his messages were in all circumstances immune from scrutiny.”).
47. E.g., Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733 (“Whilst in the mail, they can only be opened
and examined under like warrant, issued upon similar oath or affirmation, particularly describing
the thing to be seized, as is required when papers are subjected to search in one’s own household.”).
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C. Public Exposure Doctrine
The public exposure doctrine is fairly intuitive: what an individual exposes to the public, he lacks an expectation of privacy in.48 This rule is not
absolute, as not every public exposure vitiates Fourth Amendment protection.49 A prime example is the central telephone booth case, Katz v. United
States, where the Supreme Court recognized the expectations of privacy
when individuals are in public.50 Although the Court emphasized that “objects, activities, or statements that [a person] exposes to the ‘plain view’ of
outsiders” do not receive Fourth Amendment protection,51 the Court counteractively noted that “what [one] seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may [still] be constitutionally protected.”52
While in public, Katz stepped inside a public telephone booth, closed the
door behind him, paid the fee to make a call, and began communicating.53
Left with analyzing the constitutional protection of public observation, the
Court expressed that it was not the “intruding eye”54 that warranted an expectation of privacy for Katz; it was the “uninvited ear.”55 Katz’ deliberate
attempt to keep his phone call private meant that Katz had an expectation
“that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the
world,” and this expectation is one that society agreed with.56

48. E.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983) (“A person traveling in an
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements
from one place to another.”).
49. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967) (explaining that “what a person
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”).
50. Id. at 350–51.
51. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 351–52 (majority opinion).
53. Id. at 352 (“One who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that
permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece
will not be broadcast to the world.”); id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 352 (majority opinion).
55. Id.
56. Id.
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Vehicles are also subject to the public exposure doctrine.57 When vehicles are “thrust[ed] into the public eye,”58 on first impression, the public
exposure doctrine leads us to believe that simply observing the vehicle is not
a Fourth Amendment search.59 But this is not always true. One example
stems from “longer term” monitoring by law enforcement.60 Regardless if a
vehicle is “disclosed to the public at large,”61 depending on how long law
enforcement officials observe the vehicle, they could violate the Fourth
Amendment.62

1. Length of Surveillance
The Supreme Court has underscored the point that society does not expect that law enforcement would (or could) expend the time, resources, and
money to monitor and catalogue every detail about an individual for long
periods of time.63 The Supreme Court has also expressed concern that
lengthy surveillance has the capability of revealing an abundance of personal
information about an individual.64 Revealing large quantities of personal information is not what society expects to volunteer to the general public when
traveling in public.65 As Justice Ginsburg put it:
57. See, e.g., New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114 (1986); United States v. Knotts, 460
U.S. 276, 281 (1983); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 412 (2012).
58. Class, 475 U.S at 114.
59. See, e.g., Class, 475 U.S at 114 (referring to a vehicle, “to examine it does not constitute
a [Fourth Amendment] search.”).
60. Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 430 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
61. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2215 (2018); see Jones, 565 U.S. at 415
(Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
62. See, e.g., Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
63. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring in
judgement) (“[S]ociety’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others would not—
and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement
of an individual’s car for a very long period.”)).
64. See, e.g., Jones, 565 U.S. at 415–16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 416; id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
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The whole of one’s movements over the course of a month is not
constructively exposed to the public because, like a rap sheet, that
whole reveals far more than the individual movements it
comprises. The difference is not one of degree but of kind, for no
single journey reveals the habits and patterns that mark the
distinction between a day in the life and a way of life.66
The aggregation of this information creates a “mosaic.”67 The so-called
mosaic theory is “premised on aggregation: it considers whether a set of nonsearches aggregated together amount to a search because their collection and
subsequent analysis creates a revealing mosaic.”68 The Supreme Court explains that analyzing information in the aggregate has the potential to reveal
“the sum of one’s public movements” that could not be reasonably discoverable by the general public.69 In other words, what the public observes in a
short length of time does not compare to the revealing nature of a longer
observation by law enforcement.70
For example, if Bella goes to the grocery store on Monday, the public
may observe the streets Bella drives on, the route Bella takes to the grocery
store, the name of the grocery store, and perhaps the address of Bella’s home.
Now suppose law enforcement followed Bella for seven days straight. Law
enforcement could observe much more information concerning: (1) where
Bella shops; (2) where Bella works; (3) where Bella eats; (4) what Bella does
on the weekends; and (5) who Bella associates with. Narrowing in on “aggregation,” it follows that any particular investigation could run afoul of the

66. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 561–62 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
67. See generally David E. Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom
of Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628 (2005) (noting that the term “mosaic,” is a “borrowed [term]
from national security law.”).
68. See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH.
L. REV. 311 (2012) (explaining the implications of the mosaic theory).
69. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
70. See, e.g., Gabriel R. Schlabach, Privacy in The Cloud: The Mosaic Theory and the
Stored Communications Act, 67 STAN. L. REV. 677, 678–79 (2015) (explaining that “[u]nder this
theory, certain types of long-term (or otherwise expansive) surveillance violate a suspect’s reasonable expectation of privacy, even when each individual act of surveillance would otherwise pass
Fourth Amendment muster, because the government can analyze the information in the aggregate
to infer private details about the suspect that no individual member of the public could reasonably
discover by observing her for a short time.”).
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Fourth Amendment depending on the length of surveillance.71 One wonders,
how long is too long?72 And how much information is too much information? To date, the Supreme Court has yet to establish an exact demarcation line separating long term surveillance from short term surveillance.73
Still, the Court continues to exploit the duration of law enforcement surveillance, including the technology used by law enforcement when surveilling.

2. Technology Employed by Law Enforcement
The means by which law enforcement obtains information from individuals continues to, and perhaps for good reason, face scrutiny by the Supreme Court.74 Depending on the cost, ease, and efficiency of obtaining information, law enforcement could run afoul of the Fourth Amendment.75 But
how can cost, difficulty, and efficiency influence the Supreme Court’s decision?76 One reason offered is that the methods by which law enforcement

71. See Kerr, supra note 68, at 343–49 (advocating that “courts should reject the mosaic
theory.”).
72. Orin S. Kerr, When Does a Carpenter Search Start—and When Does It Stop?,
LAWFARE (July 6, 2018, 10:24 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/when-does-carpenter-searchstart-and-when-does-it-stop [https://perma.cc/63QN-KBDF].
73. See, e.g., Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment) (“We need not
identify with precision the point at which the tracking of this vehicle became a search, for the line
was surely crossed before the 4-week mark.”).
74. See, e.g., id. at 415–16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (arguing that “because GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement
practices: ‘limited police resources and community hostility.’”); see also United States v. Maynard,
615 F.3d 544, 566 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (explaining that “when it comes to the Fourth Amendment,
means do matter.”).
75. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217–18 (2018) (explaining that “cell
phone tracking is remarkably easy, cheap, and efficient compared to traditional investigative
tools.”).
76. See, e.g., id. at 2266 (Gorsuch, J., dissent) (“At what point does access to electronic
data amount to ‘arbitrary’ authority? When does police surveillance become ‘too permeating’? And
what sort of ‘obstacles’ should judges ‘place’ in law enforcement’s path when it does? We simply
do not know.”).

NETNISS (DO NOT DELETE)

14

12/4/19 11:11 AM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:1

obtains information could disrupt the balance of societal expectations towards law enforcement’s authority.77 Another reason is that society does not
expect that difficult, elaborate, and costly techniques will be employed by
law enforcement in order to gather information on individuals.78 Indeed, as
more and more law enforcement agencies are using technology to track the
physical whereabouts of individuals, there is a need to balance the playing
field between what society expects and how law enforcement obtains information on society.79 As one commentator points out, “[t]he law intentionally
limits the scope of police power to limit the government’s capacity for abusive practices.”80 This, perhaps, explains the Supreme Court’s constant need
to strike “a certain balance between government power and individual
rights.”81

77. See, e.g., Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (explaining that “the government’s unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse . . . [and] may ‘alter the relationship between citizen and government in
a way that is inimical to democratic society.’”).
78. Id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment) (“‘[S]ociety’s expectation has been that
law enforcement agents and others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly
monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.’”).
79. See, e.g., When Does a Carpenter Search Start—and When Does It Stop?, supra note
72 (explaining that because technology has made law enforcement’s access to cell-site location
information “easy and potentially very common, the law needs to step in and make that surveillance
difficult and rare again.”).
80. Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of The Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV.
L. REV. 476, 485 (2011) [hereinafter Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory].
81. Id. at 485–86 (explaining that “[i]f both the law and police practice remain constant,
the use of new tools to commit crimes will let wrongdoers commit more crimes and will correspondingly diminish police power to stop them. Of course, the police use new tools, too. For the
police trying to solve crimes, new tools mean new ways to solve crimes. If the police use those new
tools - and if the law allows the use of the new tools more readily than traditional methods to
investigate the same offense - the new tools can expand government power by letting the government collect more information more easily than before.”).
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III. THE CARPENTER DECISION
After a slew of RadioShack and T-Mobile robberies in 2011,82 prosecutors obtained two court orders under the Stored Communications Act,83
compelling cellular telephone service providers MetroPCS and Sprint to turn
over historical cell-site location information of Timothy Carpenter.84 Unlike
a search warrant which requires probable cause, the Stored Communications
Act allows the government to compel the disclosure of certain telecommunications records when law enforcement shows reasonable grounds for believing that the records are “relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation.”85 This standard is substantially lower than the probable cause
standard required of a warrant.86 The cell-site records revealed that “Carpenter’s phone was near” most of the robbery sites “‘at the exact time’” the
robberies took place.87 Carpenter argued that the government violated the
Fourth Amendment by obtaining the cell-site records without a search warrant supported by probable cause.88 Despite contesting the means in which
law enforcement obtained the cell-site location information, Carpenter was
convicted.89

82. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012). For a thorough analysis of the Stored Communications
Act, see generally Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislature’s Guide to Amending it, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208 (2004).
84. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212 (One order sought MetroPCS records for 152 days of
calls but yielded records spanning 127 days. The second order requested seven days of Sprint
records but yielded data for two days. Together, the data provided prosecutors with “12,898 location points cataloging Carpenter’s movements—an average of 101 data points per day.”).
85. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
86. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221.
87. Id. at 2213 (citation omitted).
88. Id. at 2212.
89. Id. at 2212–13.
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A. The Sixth Circuit Court’s Ruling
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals relied heavily on the traditional third-party doctrine in upholding Carpenter’s conviction.90 The
court analyzed whether individuals assume the risk that their location history
will be recorded and maintained. In doing so, the court emphasized that “any
cellphone user who has seen her phone’s signal strength fluctuate must know
that, when she places or receives a call, her phone ‘exposes’ its location to
the nearest cell tower and thus to the company that operates the tower.”91
Moreover, “any cellphone user who has paid ‘roaming’ (i.e., out-of-network)
charges—or even cellphone users who have not— should know that wireless
carriers have ‘facilities for recording’ locational information and that ‘the
phone company does in fact record this information for a variety of legitimate business purposes.’”92 The court refused to accept that the “least-sophisticated phone user”93 may not know that their location information was
being monitored, and instead re-affirmed the presumption that individuals
assume such risks accompanied with sharing information with third parties.94
The court also distinguished between content information and non-content information, and explained that while “the content of personal communications is private, the information necessary to get those communications
from point A to point B is not.”95 Cell-site data, according to the Sixth Circuit, is akin to the mailing addresses “that facilitate personal communications, rather than part of the content of those communications themselves.”96
Thus, the cell-site data in Carpenter concerned only non-content information, which did not require the government to obtain a warrant supported

90. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 886–90 (6th Cir. 2016).
91. Id. at 888.
92. Id. (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741–43 (1979)).
93. Id. at 887.
94. Id. at 887–88.
95. Id. at 886.
96. Id. at 887.
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by probable cause because individuals have no privacy interest in non-content information.97
The Sixth Circuit also weighed in on the level of precision that cell-site
location data reveals.98 In doing so, the court distinguished cell-site data
from data collected by a global positioning system (GPS).99 The court emphasized that cell-site location information reveals an inexact location
“within a 3.5 million square-foot to 100 million square-foot area—as much
as 12,500 times less accurate” than GPS devices which “are accurate within
about 50 feet.”100 Based on the increased level of accuracy that GPS data
produces, GPS data can reveal precise details about an individual that could
not be revealed by cell-site data.101 As a result, the government’s warrantless
collection of historical cell-site data under the Stored Communications Act
was permissible.

B. The United States Supreme Court’s Ruling
On review, the United States Supreme Court, in a narrow 5-4 decision,
held that the government’s acquisition of historical cell-site location information was a Fourth Amendment search under Katz’ reasonable expectation
of privacy test.102 Beginning with the Stored Communications Act, the Court
refused to accept that law enforcement could obtain seven days’ worth of
historical cell-site location information using a court order under the Stored

97. Id. at 887–88 (explaining that cell-site location records “fall on the unprotected side of
this line . . . [because] [t]hose records say nothing about the content of any calls. Instead the records
include routing information.”).
98. Id. at 889.
99. Id. (emphasizing that “the locational data here are accurate within a 3.5 million squarefoot to 100 million square-foot area—as much as 12,500 times less accurate than the GPS data
in Jones.”).
100. Id. (“[Cell-site] data could do no better than locate the defendants’ cellphones within
a 120- (or sometimes 60-) degree radial wedge extending between one-half mile and two miles in
length. Which is to say the locational data here are accurate within a 3.5 million square-foot to 100
million square-foot area—as much as 12,500 times less accurate than the GPS data in Jones.”).
101. Id. at 886–90 (citation omitted) (explaining that unlike GPS data which “might tell a
story of trips to ‘the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union
meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and on,’ cell-site data cannot tell
that story.”).
102. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217–19 (2018).
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Communications Act.103 Instead, to obtain this information, the government
must generally obtain a warrant.104
Next, the Court strengthened its stance on privacy by reaffirming the
need to scale back law enforcement’s ease in obtaining information on the
public.105 Obtaining cell-site location information, in the eyes of the Court,
“is remarkably easy . . . and efficient” for law enforcement—and provides
law enforcement with archived information about an individual “at practically no expense.”106 The Court explained that society does not expect to
reveal a historical database to the world when venturing out in public, as
opposed to exposing the single-day observances to public goers.107 Thus, the
government’s acquisition of Carpenter’s historical cell-site location information “invaded Carpenter’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole
of his physical movements.”108
Finally, the Court expressly rejected the viability of the third-party doctrine’s use as applied to historical cell-site location information for at least
two reasons. First, cell-site data is both qualitatively and quantitatively dif-

103. Id. at 2221–23 (“While police must get a warrant when collecting CSLI to assist in the
mine-run criminal investigation, the rule we set forth does not limit their ability to respond to an
ongoing emergency.”).
104. Id. at 2221 (“Before compelling a wireless carrier to turn over a subscriber’s CSLI,
the Government’s obligation is a familiar one—get a warrant.”).
105. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (addressing the common usage of thermal imaging technology, while emphasizing that “all details [in the home] are intimate
details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.”); United States v. Jones,
565 U.S. 400, 403 (2012) (addressing the unconstitutionality of law enforcement attaching a GPS
on a vehicle and monitoring it for twenty-eight days); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385–86
(2014) (addressing the ubiquity of cell phones and the vast quantity of data stored therein); Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2206 (addressing the digital data stored by cell service providers from users’
cell phones pinging to cell-site towers throughout their locale).
106. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217–18 (“And like GPS monitoring, cell phone tracking is
remarkably easy, cheap, and efficient compared to traditional investigative tools. With just the click
of a button, the Government can access each carrier’s deep repository of historical location information at practically no expense.”).
107. See id. (holding that “society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and
others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every
single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.”).
108. Id. at 2219.
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ferent than the phone records and bank records collected in Smith and Miller.109 In other words, cell-site data reveals more personal and intimate information, and the amount of information cell-site data reveals exceeds the
single, day-to-day expectancies of society. Second, the Court underscored
that individuals do not actually share their location information because “cell
phones and the services they provide are ‘such a pervasive and insistent part
of daily life’ that carrying one is indispensable to participation in modern
society.”110 Because cell phones are considered absolutely necessary, it is
not realistic to argue that individuals assume the risk that their location information will be documented, catalogued, and volunteered to third parties
simply by carrying and using a cell phone in public.111 Carpenter implicitly
incorporates Justice Marshall’s dissenting opinion, stating that “[i]t is idle to
speak of ‘assuming’ risks in contexts where, as a practical matter, individuals
have no realistic alternative.”112 Carpenter similarly pointed out that,
“[a]part from disconnecting the phone from the network, there is no way to
avoid leaving behind a trail of location data.”113 In Carpenter’s view, disconnecting a cell-phone to avoid cell-phone location tracking is an unreasonable alternative that could not be expected of society. Although Miller and
Smith hold that, under the traditional third-party doctrine, individuals have
no expectation of privacy in information voluntarily shared with another,
based on the Court’s ruling in Carpenter, individuals now have a “reduced
expectation of privacy in information knowingly shared with another,” for
historical cell-site data, anyway.114 Despite proffering new language that

109. Id. (“There is a world of difference between the limited types of personal information
addressed in Smith and Miller and the exhaustive chronicle of location information casually collected by wireless carriers today.”).
110. Id. at 2220 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014)).
111. Id. (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979) (“[I]n no meaningful sense
does the user voluntarily ‘assume[] the risk’ of turning over a comprehensive dossier of his physical
movements to third parties.”)).
112. Smith, 442 U.S. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
113. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
114. Id. at 2219 (italics added).
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suggests a revised traditional third-party doctrine, the Supreme Court emphasized that its decision does not change the holding in Miller and Smith.115

IV. THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN MILLER/SMITH AND CARPENTER IN
THE DIGITAL WORLD
“Why is cell site location information more sensitive than bank records,
which particularly today, when a lot of people don’t use cash much, if at all,
a bank record will disclose purchases?”116

A. Traditional Third-Party Doctrine versus Digital Third-Party
Doctrine
Prior to Carpenter, the Supreme Court applied the third-party doctrine
in an all-or-nothing fashion. By this logic, if the third-party doctrine applied,
the individual that volunteered information to a third party held no privacy
interest in that information.117 This means that under Miller and Smith, the
government can request information from third parties using a subpoena instead of a warrant.118 As explained in Miller and Smith, if an individual
shares information with a third party, he lacks any reasonable expectation of
privacy in that information.119 The reason given by the Supreme Court is
that individuals assume the risk that their information will be divulged to the
world when shared with third parties.120 Not only do individuals assume that
risk, but individuals lack a connection to their information shared with a third
115. Id. at 2220 (holding that its decision “do[es] not disturb the application of Smith and
Miller.”).
116. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018)
(No. 16-402) (asked by Justice Alito).
117. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–44 (1976); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735, 743–44 (1979); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335–36 (1973); United States v. White,
401 U.S. 745, 751–52 (1971) (plurality opinion); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).
118. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442; Smith, 442 U.S. at 745–46.
119. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (holding that a bank account holder has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his bank records detailing his financial activity); Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44
(holding that individuals lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone numbers dialed from
inside the home).
120. See, e.g., Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (concerning financial records); see also Smith, 442
U.S. at 743–44 (concerning phone records); see also White, 401 U.S. at 751–52 (concerning personal conversations).
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party because the individual can “neither [assert] ownership nor possession”
in the records maintained, stored, and produced by the third party.121
In the digital world we live in today, Carpenter declined to apply the
traditional third-party doctrine to historical cell-site location information.122
If digital data is involved, an individual might have a “reduced expectation
of privacy in information knowingly shared with another.”123 Unlike Miller
and Smith, the government must generally obtain a warrant to obtain digital
data, such as historical cell-site location information, from third parties.124
Because Carpenter concerned digital data, namely the data generated from
a cell-phone’s connectivity to cell-site towers, it follows that two separate
third-party doctrine theories now exist: the (1) traditional third-party doctrine
governed by Miller and Smith, and the (2) digital third-party doctrine governed by Carpenter.125
Before delving into the digital third-party doctrine, it is important to
understand why the Supreme Court felt it necessary to avoid using the existing traditional third-party doctrine. First, cell-site location information is
qualitatively different than bank statements or phone records.126 In other
words, cell-site location information has the capability of revealing personal
and intimate details that could not be compared to the revealing nature of
bank records or phone records.127 Second, cell-site location information is
quantitatively different than bank statements or phone records. That is, cell121. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2227 (2018) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted) (explaining that Miller and Smith limit an individual’s ability to “assert Fourth
Amendment interests in property to which they lack a ‘requisite connection.’”); Miller, 425 U.S. at
440; Smith, 442 U.S. at 741.
122. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216–17 (majority opinion) (“But while the third-party doctrine applies to telephone numbers and bank records, it is not clear whether its logic extends to the
qualitatively different category of cell-site records.”).
123. Id. at 2219 (italics in original).
124. Id. at 2221 (“Before compelling a wireless carrier to turn over a subscriber’s CSLI,
the Government’s obligation is a familiar one—get a warrant.”).
125. Change to the traditional third-party doctrine comes as no true surprise. See, e.g.,
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (emphasizing that “it
may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”).
126. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2209–10.
127. Id.
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site location information paints a much broader and detailed picture about an
individual than do bank records or phone records.128 One reason for this is
the sheer volume of location information that cell providers document and
maintain for years.129 Third, unlike conducting business with a bank or making a phone call, individuals do not truly share their cell-site location information to third parties.130 The high Court reasons that cell phones are considered a necessity in the modern age, and carrying a cell phone in public is
required in order to participate “in modern society.”131 Since individuals
must possess (and carry) a cell phone, such logic does not extend to individuals having knowledge that their location information is being shared with
wireless providers.132 Fourth, unlike the affirmative act of dialing numbers
to make a phone call or swiping a debit card to make a financial transaction,
individuals do not, themselves, signal cell-site towers and have their cell-site
location information documented.133 Merely carrying a cell phone in one’s
pocket is all that is needed to signal a cell tower because whenever a cell
phone is turned on, it automatically alerts the nearest cell tower.134 This process enables the cell phone—and by that, the service provider—to document

128. Id. at 2219 (“In mechanically applying the third-party doctrine to this case, the Government fails to appreciate that there are no comparable limitations on the revealing nature of
CSLI.”).
129. Id. at 2210, 2219 (noting that a majority of wireless providers store location information for five years).
130. Id. at 2210, 2219–20.
131. Id. at 2219–20.
132. See, e.g., In re United States for an Order Directing Provider of Elec. Commun. Serv.
To Disclose Recs. to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining that “[a] cell phone
customer has not ‘voluntarily’ shared his location information with a cellular provider in any meaningful way . . . [because] it is unlikely that cell phone customers are aware that their cell phone
providers collect and store historical location information.”).
133. See, e.g., State v. Earls, 214 N.J. 564, 577 (N.J. 2013) (noting that “[c]ell phones can
be tracked when they are used to make a call, send a text message, or connect to the Internet—or
when they take no action at all, so long as the phone is not turned off.”).
134. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (explaining that “a cell phone logs a cell-site record by
dint of its operation, without any affirmative act on the part of the user beyond powering up. Virtually any activity on the phone generates CSLI.”).
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and improve connectivity of the cell phone.135 As a result, it is the cell phone,
not the user of the cell phone that takes steps to share location information.136
For these reasons, Carpenter declined to extend the traditional third-party
doctrine to cell-site location information.137
Therefore, the digital third-party doctrine requires assessment of the (1)
nature of the information and (2) voluntariness. Assessing the nature of the
information requires examination of how detailed, comprehensive, and intimate the information is. Accordingly, both (a) quantitative and (b) qualitative assessments of the information surveilled should be considered. Second,
the Supreme Court implies that voluntariness should be assessed two-fold:
by examining how necessary the device is according to the status quo, then
considering whether the individual has taken any affirmative act to convey
information to a third party.138 Thus, when examining voluntariness, both
the (a) pervasiveness of the device and any (b) affirmative act taken by the
individual should be assessed.139
Going forward, courts will invariably engage in an ad-hoc factual inquiry when faced with digital data, then decide whether to apply the traditional rule represented by Miller and Smith, or the digital rule represented by
Carpenter.140 To what extent does Carpenter’s digital rule apply to other
means of digital data, like a cell phone’s Internet browsing history, or the

135. Earls, 214 N.J. at 576–79 (discussing the basics of how cell-site location information
is generated).
136. See In re Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F.
Supp. 2d 747, 750 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (explaining that cell phones search for signal “every seven
seconds or when the signal strength weakens, regardless of whether a call is placed.”).
137. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2209, 2216–17 (explaining that “[t]he digital data at issue—
personal location information maintained by a third party—does not fit neatly under existing precedents.”).
138. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (citation omitted) (explaining that “[i]n the first
place, cell phones and the service they provide are . . . indispensable to participation to modern
society.” And “[s]econd, a cell phone logs a cell-site record by dint of its operation, without any
affirmative act on the part of the user beyond powering up.”).
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 945 N.Y.S.2d 505, 507–10 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012) (holding
that a Twitter user had no Fourth Amendment standing to challenge a lawful subpoena issued
against the company for locational information embedded in his posts because he voluntarily shared
that information with Twitter).
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location information gathered by navigational apps on a cell phone?141 Even
more puzzling is that individuals still maintain no expectation of privacy in
“a lifetime of bank or phone records,” but do maintain some expectation of
privacy in historical cell-site location information.142 As discussed below,
the Supreme Court’s skewed valuation of the privacy interests maintained in
digital data versus bank statements and phone records is mind-boggling.143
Bank records, credit card records, and phone records are just as qualitatively
and quantitively comparable with digital data, similar to cell-site location
information. Today, as technology even allows for individuals to make purchases “[w]ith just the click of a button”144 on their cellular device, the
Court’s reasoning in Carpenter overlooks the fact that Miller and Smith are
implicated in digital data.

1. Digital Data
On March 12, 2020, the World Wide Web (“Web”) turns thirty-one.145
To some, the Web’s birthday is a celebration. But to others, the Web’s birthday is simply a reminder that the Web keeps tabs on its users. As former
Google CEO Eric Schmidt put it: “We know where you are. We know where
you’ve been. We can more or less know what you’re thinking about.”146

141. See, e.g., Fourth Amendment & the Internet, supra note 28, at 1006 (questioning “How
should the Fourth Amendment apply to the Internet? What kinds of online surveillance should the
Constitution permit? When should the government be allowed to monitor a criminal suspect’s email, web surfing, or instant messaging?”).
142. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2267 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“All we know is that historical
cell-site location information (for seven days, anyway) escapes Smith and Miller’s shorn grasp,
while a lifetime of bank or phone records does not.”).
143. See, e.g., id. at 2262, (questioning “Why is someone’s location when using a phone so
much more sensitive than who he was talking to (Smith) or what financial transactions he engaged
in (Miller)? I do not know and the Court does not say.”).
144. Id. at 2218 (majority opinion).
145. See generally Susannah Fox & Lee Rainie, The Web at 25 in the U.S., PEW RES. CTR.
(Feb.
27,
2014),
https://www.pewinternet.org/2014/02/27/the-web-at-25-in-the-u-s/
[https://perma.cc/Q3PU-8ZGE].
146. Derek Thompson, Google’s CEO: ‘The Laws are Written by Lobbyists,’ THE
ATLANTIC (Oct. 1, 2010), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2010/10/googles-ceothe-laws-are-written-by-lobbyists/63908/ [https://perma.cc/JPC5-YZAT].

NETNISS (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

12/4/19 11:11 AM

ATTEMPTS TOWARDS A ZERO-SUM GAME

25

The use of the Internet has raised, and continues to raise, many privacy
concerns considering the fact that the majority of Americans use the Internet.147 In the twenty-first century: 73% of adults have used or currently use
YouTube; 69% of adults have used or currently use Facebook; 37% of adults
have used or currently use Instagram; 28% of adults have used or currently
use Pinterest; 27% of adults have used or currently use LinkedIn; 24% of
adults have used or currently use Snapchat; 22% of adults have used or currently use Twitter; 20% of adults have used or currently use WhatsApp; and
11% of adults have used or currently use Reddit.148 Simply put, “[t]he reality
of today’s world is that social media, whether it be Twitter, Facebook, Pinterest, Google+ or any other site, is the way people communicate.”149
The Internet gave rise to social media, whose devaluation of privacy
has caused an irreversible outcome. Search engines like Google and Yahoo,
for example, routinely gain revenue from selling user information.150 A
user’s search query can include directions to a mistress’ residence, symptoms
of a sexually transmitted disease, or the “top 10” dating apps, just to name a
few.151 Another popular foe is Facebook. The tech giant recently found itself
under scrutiny for the way it handled its 50 million users in the wake of
Cambridge Analytica’s access to the users’ data.152 Still, “[r]oughly twothirds of U.S. adults (68%)” reported being Facebook users in 2018, “and

147. Monica Anderson et al., 10% of Americans Don’t Use the Internet. Who Are They?,
PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/04/22/some-americans-dont-use-the-internet-who-are-they/ [https://perma.cc/XK5R-H783].
148. Andrew Perrin & Monica Anderson, Share of U.S. Adults Using Social Media, Including Facebook, Is Mostly Unchanged Since 2018, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 10, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/04/10/share-of-u-s-adults-using-social-media-including-facebook-is-mostly-unchanged-since-2018/ [https://perma.cc/7UNY-3X3M].
149. People v. Harris, 945 N.Y.S.2d 505, 507 n.3 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012).
150. See Ira Rubinstein et al., Data Mining and Internet Profiling: Emerging Regulatory
and Technological Approaches, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 261, 271–72 (2008).
151. Vivian Adame, Consumers’ Obsession Becoming Retailers’ Possession: The Way that
Retailers are Benefiting from Consumers’ Presence on Social Media, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 653,
659–60 (2016).
152. See Tiffany Hsu & Cecilia Kang, Demands Grow for Facebook To Explain Its Privacy
Policies, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/26/technology/ftc-facebook-investigation-cambridge-analytica.html [https://perma.cc/U7JK-3ND4].
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roughly three-quarters of those users access[ed] Facebook on a daily basis.”153 Since 2018, the number of Facebook users has virtually remained
the same.154 In essence, the quantity and quality of information obtained
from the use of the Internet is alarming,155 but any eagerness of users to discontinue using data-intensive applications such as Facebook is not statistically evident.156
Today, more Americans either use or own a cell phone than a desktop
or laptop computer.157 The growing spread of cell phones has arguably surpassed any other form of technology.158 Without a cell phone, it is difficult
to imagine how an individual could effectively participate in modern society.159 In fact, at least 95% of Americans own a cell phone,160 resulting in a
decline of desktop or laptop ownership.161 In the not-too-distant future, the

153. Aaron Smith & Monica Anderson, Social Media Use in 2018, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar.
1, 2018), https://www.pewinternet.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2018/02/PI_2018.03.01_SocialMedia_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/DA7S-S7K9].
154. Perrin & Anderson, supra note 148.
155. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 395–96 (2014) (“An Internet search and
browsing history . . . could reveal an individual’s private interests or concerns—perhaps a search
for certain symptoms of disease, coupled with frequent visits to WebMD.”).
156. Perrin & Anderson, supra note 148.
157. Paul Hitlin, Internet, Social Media Use and Device Ownership in U.S. Have Plateaued
After Years of Growth, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/09/28/internet-social-media-use-and-device-ownership-in-u-s-have-plateaued-afteryears-of-growth/ [https://perma.cc/X7GX-885Y].
158. Michael DeGusta, Are Smart Phones Spreading Faster than Any Technology in Human History?, MIT TECH. REV. (May 9, 2012), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/427787/aresmart-phones-spreading-faster-than-any-technology-in-human-history/ [https://perma.cc/C6L9BFH8].
159. Riley, 573 U.S. at 385 (noting that phones have become “such a pervasive and insistent
part of daily life” that carrying one is indispensable to participation in modern society).
160. Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2019), https://www.pewinternet.org/factsheet/mobile/ [https://perma.cc/P5GQ-T6RL].
161. Hitlin, supra note 157.

NETNISS (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

12/4/19 11:11 AM

ATTEMPTS TOWARDS A ZERO-SUM GAME

27

number of cell phone ownership is expected to reach north of 270 million.162
This is hardly surprising considering that cell phones are much cheaper, easier to carry, and can be used in more locations than a desktop or laptop computer can be used.163 Cell phones could also be called “minicomputers”164
because of their limitless capabilities: A cell phone can act as a telephone,
camera, video player, diary, calendar, television, map, newspaper, video
game, photo album, stereo, and more.165 Aside from these basic functions—
most of which already equipped into cell phones—a cell phone user also has
the option of downloading applications, otherwise known as “apps.”
With the use of apps, digital connectivity has made it possible to perhaps never have to leave your home. Tired of being single? Download a
dating app.166 Over 15% of U.S. adults have spiced things up digitally.167
Tired of going to the grocery store? Amazon has got you covered.168 Need
to make some extra cash to pay rent? Apps exist for you to make money
while lounging on your living room love seat.169 Hungry? There’s an app
162. Research Peek of the Week: Smartphone Users in the US Expected to Reach Over 270
Million by 2022, INTERNET INNOVATION ALLIANCE (July 3, 2018), https://internetinnovation.org/general/research-peek-of-the-week-smartphone-users-in-the-us-expected-to-reach-over270-million-by-2020/ [https://perma.cc/E3N5-2TMF].
163. See, e.g., Riley, 573 U.S. at 394–96 (“Even the most basic phones that sell for less than
$20 might hold photographs, picture messages, text messages, Internet browsing history, a calendar, a thousand-entry phone book, and so on.”).
164. Id. at 393.
165. See, e.g., id. (explaining that cell phones can “easily be called cameras, video players,
rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers.”).
166. Mark Jansen, The Best Dating Apps for 2019, DIGITAL TRENDS (Aug. 17, 2019, 12:30
PM), https://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/best-dating-apps/ [https://perma.cc/4NFZ-CGCT].
167. Aaron Smith, 15% of American Adults Have Used Online Dating Sites or Mobile Dating Apps, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.pewinternet.org/2016/02/11/15-percent-ofamerican-adults-have-used-online-dating-sites-or-mobile-dating-apps/
[https://perma.cc/JZF2GCZJ].
168. See, e.g., Deborah Weinswig, Online Grocery Set To Boom In 2018 (As Amazon
Acknowledges Online Grocery A Tough Market To Crack), FORBES (Mar. 1, 2018, 4:10 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/deborahweinswig/2018/03/01/online-grocery-set-to-boom-in-2018as-amazon-acknowledges-online-grocery-a-tough-market-to-crack/#e406fba520b9
[https://perma.cc/URC5-L4VT].
169. 17 Great Apps That Will Pay You Money in 2019, THE WORK AT HOME WIFE (Aug.
25, 2019), https://theworkathomewife.com/apps-will-pay-money/ [https://perma.cc/F6TZ-VK6A].
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for that too.170 Need alcohol to celebrate a forgotten birthday? Download
an app.171 Are you a Cannabis user or supporter? There’s an app to connect
you with other Cannabis users or supporters.172 Medical apps also exist to
monitor and support one’s health, such as assisting recovering alcoholics.173
Unsurprisingly, the average number of apps Americans use daily is nine,
while the monthly average is thirty.174
Is using a navigation app to prevent getting lost worth giving up your
exact location? Waze might certainly think so.175 The GPS navigation app,
purchased by Google for a billion dollars,176 not only has the ability to detect
automobile accidents and faster routes, but can also detect law enforcement.177 Yet, detecting law enforcement is less surprising than Waze’s ability to promote local eateries when a vehicle is at a standstill, otherwise

170. See, e.g., Alina Bradford & Gia Liu, The Best Food Delivery Apps of 2019, DIGITAL
TRENDS (July 30, 2019, 2:37 PM), https://www.digitaltrends.com/home/best-food-delivery-apps/
[https://perma.cc/MBC7-6R8D].
171. See, e.g., Danielle St. Pierre, Never Run Out of Boose Again Thanks to These 7 Alcohol-Delivery Apps, BEST (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.bestproducts.com/eats/g1616/liquor-alcoholdelivery-apps/ [https://perma.cc/NQY7-9CCN].
172. See, e.g., The Biggest Cannabis Social Media Community!, PUFFY,
https://puffyapp.com [https://perma.cc/4VXX-CVDE] (“Puffy App is a mobile platform for users
to puff, connect, and meet up with new friends.”).
173. See, e.g., Jessica Timmons, The Best Alcohol Addiction Recovery Apps of 2019,
(Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.healthline.com/health/addiction/top-alcoholism-iphone-android-apps#twenty—four-hours-a-day [https://perma.cc/LY7N-3JML].
HEALTHLINE

174. Sarah Perez, Report: Smartphone Owners Are Using 9 Apps per Day, 30 per Month,
TECHCRUNCH (May 4, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/05/04/report-smartphone-owners-areusing-9-apps-per-day-30-per-month/ [https://perma.cc/GZN5-DHNK].
175. Wazeopedia,
WAZE,
https://wazeopedia.waze.com/wiki/USA/About
[https://perma.cc/D6CU-WZNK] (“Waze is a 100% free turn-by-turn GPS navigation application
that provides real-time traffic updates.”).
176. Ingrid Lunden, Google Bought Waze For $1.1B, Giving A Social Data Boost To Its
Mapping
Business,
TECHCRUNCH
(June
11,
2013,
8:37
AM),
https://techcrunch.com/2013/06/11/its-official-google-buys-waze-giving-a-social-data-boost-toits-location-and-mapping-business/ [https://perma.cc/F3Y7-AM7Y].
177. About
Us,
WAZE
[https://perma.cc/A2TY-CXKV].

(Sept.

16,

2019),

https://www.waze.com/about
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known as a “zero-speed takeover.”178 Ever wonder why an ad surfaces your
Waze screen when you are at a stop sign or stopped in traffic? This is because “Google isn’t just monitoring what you do online; it’s watching you
while you’re in your car, too.”179 For some, navigation is a necessity—and
to limit being late to work or getting lost, the navigation app has clear benefits. But to others, GPS-gathered data is alarming because of the wealth of
personal information that can be revealed, like “trips to the psychiatrist, the
plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club,
the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the
mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and on.”180 Despite Waze
having the ability to “ping[] its users’ GPS every second and store[] that data,
sometimes sharing it with local governments,”181 cell phone users nonetheless continue to use the app.
The bottom line is that using technology has the potential to create a
permanent digital trail. This digital trail can reveal both personal and mundane information about one’s identity. So where does the Fourth Amendment come into play? Under the traditional third-party doctrine, Miller and
Smith imply that law enforcement can obtain, for example, DNA information
from Ancestry.com or 23andMe with a subpoena instead of a warrant supported by probable cause.182 But under the digital third-party doctrine, the
only category Carpenter adds protection to is historical cell-site location information.183 This category excludes Facebook messages, information from
178. Greg Sterling, Waze Conquers ‘Digital Dark Zone’ with in-car, out-of-home ad Coordination, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Mar. 18, 2019, 10:24 AM), https://searchengineland.com/waze-conquers-digital-dark-zone-with-in-car-out-of-home-ad-coordination-314111/
[https://perma.cc/EF3W-2BCE].
179. Monica Burton, Waze is Watching You and It Knows You Want McRibs, EATER (Mar.
19, 2019, 2:28 PM), https://www.eater.com/2019/3/19/18272694/waze-app-ads-steer-drivers-tomcdonalds-mcribs/ [https://perma.cc/32X8-T5C4].
180. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting
People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009); see also Michael Mattioli, Article: Autonomy in the Age of Autonomous Vehicles, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 277, 293 (2018).
181. Burton, supra note 179.
182. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2262–63 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(answering that “Smith and Miller say yes” to law enforcement being able to obtain “DNA from
23andMe without a warrant or probable cause.”).
183. See id. at 2221 (majority opinion) (holding that “an order issued under Section
2703(d) of the Act is not a permissible mechanism for accessing historical cell-site records.”).
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the Cannabis app, the dating app, bank and phone records, and other digital
data. The Supreme Court informs us that only cell-site location information
is deserving of some expectation of privacy because this information somehow reveals more personal information about an individual than other
data.184 It remains unexplained why an individual’s location information is
more intimate than the troves of bank records or credit card records revealing, by date and time, a virtual biography of an individual.185

2. Physical Information Turns Digital
Today’s Supreme Court discounts the fact that physical data, like a
debit card or credit card, is comparable to cell-site location information.186
Concededly, debit cards and credit cards do not ping to nearby cell towers,
nor do these cards have a tracking chip (to date) that reveals the location
information of the card.187 However, statements generated by a debit card or
credit card yield similar to identical information as cell-site location information. First, debit cards and credit cards can produce information with the
same level of accuracy as cell-site location information. Second, financial
statements are far more revealing than the mere vicinity in which a cell phone
is located. And third, with the digitalization of bank cards and credit cards,
law enforcement can learn about the identity of an individual without the
individual even leaving his or her home.
The precision of bank records far exceeds that of CSLI. To illustrate
this, suppose Jeff visits a shopping center for seven days straight and keeps
his cell phone on him at all times. Further suppose that Jeff makes some type
of purchase at the shopping mall for each day he is there. He uses his banking card because he never carries cash on him. Using only CSLI and banking
records, which data provides law enforcement with the most actionable in-

184. Id. at 2216–17.
185. See id. at 2262 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (questioning “Why is someone’s location
when using a phone so much more sensitive than who he was talking to (Smith) or what financial
transactions he engaged in (Miller)? I do not know and the Court does not say.”).
186. See id. at 2219 (majority opinion) (“In mechanically applying the third-party doctrine
to this case, the Government fails to appreciate that there are no comparable limitations on the
revealing nature of CSLI.”).
187. See, e.g., Tylene Welch, Can You Track a Debit Card or Credit Card with a Smart
Chip?, FISCAL TIGER (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.fiscaltiger.com/can-track-debit-card-creditcard-smart-chip/ [https://perma.cc/B5YV-H8N6].
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formation? Beginning with CSLI, obtaining CSLI will provide law enforcement insight as to the vicinity that Jeff was physically located based on his
cell phone pinging to the cell towers. This, of course, assumes that a cell
tower is located near the shopping center. Intelligent as law enforcement
officials are, they may be able to deduce that Jeff was at the shopping mall
each day based on the fact that Jeff—that is, his cell phone—triggered a cell
site next to the shopping mall each day he was there. But if law enforcement
wanted to obtain the cell-site location information for the past seven days,
they would need to obtain a warrant.188 Carpenter makes that clear.189
On the other hand, if law enforcement officials obtained Jeff’s banking
records, to reiterate the late Justice Brennan’s position, the seven-day banking records would “provide[] a virtual current biography.”190 Jeff’s banking
records would reveal (1) what Jeff purchased, (2) the specific store Jeff made
the purchase at, (3) the location of the store Jeff made the purchase at, (4)
the amount Jeff spent on each purchase, and (5) the date and time of each
purchase Jeff made. But unlike CSLI, law enforcement can obtain this information through compulsory means—i.e., by subpoenaing the bank for
Jeff’s transaction history for the past seven days. Taking a step further, while
banking records can also reveal the flowers or jewelry Jeff purchased for his
mistress, the $199 handgun suspected of criminal wrongdoing, the adult
store video, and more, CSLI could not provide that information. Instead,
CSLI would only reveal the vicinity of Jeff’s physical whereabouts,191 or the
vicinity of a cell phone lent to a family member or friend, left in a taxi, or
stolen.192

188. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 n.3 (“[W]e need not decide whether there is a limited
period for which the Government may obtain an individual’s historical CSLI free from Fourth
Amendment scrutiny, and if so, how long that period might be. It is sufficient for our purposes
today to hold that accessing seven days of CSLI constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.”).
189. Id. at 2221.
190. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 451 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
191. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (emphasizing that the cell-site location information
merely revealed “that Carpenter’s cell phone was in the general vicinity of four of the nine robberies.”).
192. Although not explored, there may be situations where only one or two stores are near
a cell tower, and by process of elimination, law enforcement could accurately identify where an
individual was.
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Second, while cell-site location information can create a chronological
timeline of an individual’s past and present,193 “the totality of bank records
provides a virtual current biography”194 of a person’s past, present, and future. With bank records in hand, the government can learn and deduce highly
personal details.195 For example, banking records allow the government to:
(1) catalogue an individual’s expenses and approximate his or her income
based on deposits; (2) determine where and what an individual eats for breakfast, lunch, and dinner; (3) determine who an individual’s doctor is and when
he or she visited the hospital; (4) determine the political preference or porn
magazine an individual is subscribed to; (5) determine whether an individual
is a heavy drinker based on frequent trips to the liquor store or bar receipts;
(6) determine where an individual takes his family or mistress on vacation;
(7) determine the exact date and time an individual grocery shops at Whole
Foods; (8) determine whether an individual poorly manages his money; (9)
determine an individual’s rent amount, cost of utilities, and other household
expenses; and (10) determine the ATM withdrawal at the sole ATM machine
inside a brothel.
With this information, the government can ascertain an individual’s
habits, hobbies, health, political preference, morals, and much more. Indeed,
where bank records and credit card records are distinguished from cell-site
location information is the fact that the government can study and predict an
individual’s future conduct. For example, past financial statements could
help estimate the cost of next month’s rent, utilities, child support, or even
which bar the individual will be at next Friday since that individual’s past
financial statements reveal a trend. These very few—and realistic—examples help shed light on the fact that financial statements provide law enforcement with a time machine capable of traveling both in the past and in the

193. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2210 (CSLI “give[s] the Government near perfect surveillance
and allow it to travel back in time to retrace a person’s whereabouts.”).
194. Miller, 425 U.S. at 451 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
195. See id.; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.
Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402) (Justice Kennedy reasoned that bank records differ from cell-site
location information “[p]articularly because the information in the bank records that Justice Alito
referred to are not publicly known. Your whereabouts are publicly known. People can see you.
Surveillance officers can follow you. It seems to me that this is much less private than - than the
case that Justice Alito is discussing.”).
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future. And unlike the five-year retention of cell-site location information,196
a majority of larger banks maintain records for seven years.197
Third, the digitalization of debit cards and credit cards makes financial
statements much more revealing in today’s market. Although credit cards
and debit cards are physical in form, they can indeed be digitized. Many
platforms, including Apple and Samsung, have built into their cellular devices a “digital wallet.”198 Apple in particular has advertised that its “Apple
Pay” digital tool “is even simpler than using your physical [debit or credit]
card, and safer too.”199 With the digitalization of debit cards and credit cards,
law enforcement can learn about an individual as if the individual livestreamed his activity within his home.200 The same could not be said for cellsite location information. Without a cell phone or cell tower, cell-site location information is not generated. Yet, with a cell phone’s ability to store a
virtual bank, information about the user can be generated while in public and
in the privacy of the user’s home. Indeed, virtual banking has made it possible to conduct business with vendors without having to leave home.201 The
Supreme Court insists that a cell phone has the capability of revealing the
“sum of an individual’s private life,” which is far more than what is “tucked
into a wallet.”202 But to carry a cell phone today is to carry a virtual bank.
196. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218 (emphasizing that a majority of wireless providers store
location information for five years).
197. See, e.g., Paperless Statements, CHASE, https://www.chase.com/personal/mobileonline-banking/login-paperless/paperless-faqs [https://perma.cc/H9QS-BKE2] (explaining that
“you can securely access up to 7 years of statements online.”).
198. Mark Edwin Burge, Apple Pay, Bitcoin, and Consumers: The ABCs of Future Public
Payments Law, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1493, 1523–24 (2016).
199. Secure, Simple, and Even More Useful, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/apple-pay
[https://perma.cc/C3CA-PFPW] (describing the usage of Apple’s Wallet app).
200. See Note, If These Walls Could Talk: The Smart Home And The Fourth Amendment
Limits of The Third Party Doctrine, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1924, 1933 (2017) (explaining that technology presents the risk of people “inviting the government into their homes and giving it a frontrow seat to their most intimate conversations.”).
201. One example is food delivery services like Uber Eats. See, e.g., How Uber Eats Works,
UBER EATS, https://about.ubereats.com/en/ [https://perma.cc/Z28L-JVJY] (explaining how Uber
Eats works).
202. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 394–95 (2014) (“The sum of an individual’s private
life can be reconstructed through a thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions; the same cannot be said of a photograph or two of loved ones tucked into a wallet.”).
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To that end, it seems clear that what an individual purchases on his or her
cell phone is far more revealing than location information. With the latter,
law enforcement must infer, based on only having information pin-pointing
that an individual was in a certain area, that the individual was indeed at the
particular place. But with the former, not only can law enforcement obtain
information concerning the cost and type of item purchased, but also where
that item was purchased from and delivered to, giving law enforcement the
full picture.

B. The Third-Party Doctrine Is “[I]ll [S]uited,”203 Period.
Carpenter explains that the third-party doctrine is “ill suited to the digital age.”204 Even if this were true, it was no less true in Miller and Smith.
Miller and Smith teach us that individuals have no expectation of privacy in
their banking activity and the phone numbers dialed on a phone.205 Apparently, because these records are “possessed, owned, and controlled” by a
third party, society has no choice but to assume that the third party may display the collected information for the world to see, including the world of
law enforcement.206 But does society truly expect that their finances and
family calls will be broadcast to the world?207 Surely “no one believes that,
if they ever did.”208 The majority in Carpenter supports its position by informing us that individuals have no choice but to keep a phone on their persons when in public, leading us to assume that individuals could not possibly
203. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
204. Id.
205. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976) (holding that a bank account
holder has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his bank records detailing his financial activity);
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (holding that individuals lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone numbers dialed from inside the home).
206. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2226–27 (2018) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). But see In re United States ex rel. Hist. Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 845 (S.D.
Tex. 2010) (“[C]onsumers are not forced to sacrifice locational privacy as the price of using cell
phones.”).
207. See, e.g., Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the “Legitimate Expectation of Privacy,” 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 1315 (1981) (“It would be unreasonable to assume that
the defendant in Katz would have had less of an expectation of privacy in the numbers he dialed
from his own private telephone than he did in the content of a conversation in a public telephone
booth.”).
208. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2262 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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volunteer their information to third parties based on the necessity of having
a cell phone.209 But what about the necessity of using banking services?
Does the fact that individuals constantly share their location information on
social media platforms affect the Court’s opinion?210
If having a cell phone is necessary to participate in this day-and-age, it
is equally as “impossible to participate in the economic life of contemporary
society without maintaining a bank account,” said Justice Brennan over forty
years ago.211 Fast-forward forty years, does the Court expect for society to
maintain a home banking service?212 Rather than store and protect troves of
financial records that “reveal much about a person’s activities, associations,
and beliefs,”213 society instead chooses to entrust that information with a
bank.
[T]he disclosure by individuals or business firms of their financial
affairs to a bank is not entirely volitional, since it is impossible to
participate in the economic life of contemporary society without
maintaining a bank account. In the course of such dealings, a
depositor reveals many aspects of his personal affairs, opinions,
habits and associations.214
When a burglar enters a home, the burglar’s likely target is the safe
kept in the basement, not the bedsheets. Inside the safe can include cash,
checks, passports, social security cards, birth certificates, personal finance
records, and more. But when a burglar enters a bank, the likelihood of the
burglar requesting cash, financial statements, and all other personal documents of only John Doe is slim to nil. The need to use conventional banking

209. Id. at 2220 (majority opinion).
210. See generally Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Private Eyes, They’re Watching You: Law
Enforcement’s Monitoring of Social Media, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 997 (2019) (exploring the privacy
implications of social media use).
211. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 451 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
212. See Ashdown, supra note 207, at 1313–14. (explaining that “it cannot be said that
financial disclosures to a bank are truly voluntary, since it is a virtual necessity to maintain a bank
account in order to participate economically in contemporary society.”).
213. Miller, 425 U.S. at 453 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 451.
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methods is especially true when mom and dad want to keep a separate college account for their child. Entrusting hundreds of thousands of dollars to
a safe accessible by, for example, guessing a pin number, is unnecessarily
risky. That risk does not fully escape in the hands of the bank, but the safety
measures undertaken by a bank adds more comfort than constantly thinking
about the $200,000 in the home safe. Using a conventional bank is simply a
necessity worth acknowledging under the Fourth Amendment’s expectations
of privacy analysis.
It bears repeating that the third-party doctrine is “ill suited,”215 period.
Under the Court’s assessment of the third-party doctrine, since society lacks
true knowledge that its location information is being received and stored by
a third party, society does not genuinely volunteer that information to the
wireless provider as a new customer does to the teller at a bank.216 The Court
reasons that a cell phone automatically triggers cell towers without much, if
any, assistance from the carrier of the cell phone.217 But it is the carrier of
the cell phone that takes the affirmative act of stepping outside their home
and entering the public.218 But for the user of the cell phone, the cell phone
presumably would not trigger cell-site towers.219 It would seem that whatever affirmative act the Court expects individuals to take must be a reasonable one. After all, the Court dismissed the option of individuals removing
the battery from their cell phone before entering the public to avoid leaving
behind a digital trail.220 Still, it remains unexplained what would happen if
society learned that its location information is being recorded and maintained
by wireless providers? Justice Alito asked this very question: “[W]hat will
215. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
216. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).
217. Id.
218. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 429–30 (4th Cir. 2016) (explaining
that “[w]ith respect to the nature of CSLI, there can be little question that cell phone users ‘convey’
CSLI to their service providers. After all, if they do not, then who does?”).
219. Understandably, the possibility of cell-site towers being placed within close proximity
to residential areas exists. This lends support to the Supreme Court’s rationale that society members could be within their own home and still generate location information because of their cell
phone’s close proximity to nearby cell-site towers.
220. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (explaining that “[a]part from disconnecting the phone
from the network, there is no way to avoid leaving behind a trail of location data. As a result, in no
meaningful sense does the user voluntarily ‘assume[ ] the risk’ of turning over a comprehensive
dossier of his physical movements.”).
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happen in the future if people – everybody begins to realize that this is – this
is provided? If you have enough police TV shows where this is shown, then
everybody will know about it, just like they know about CSI information.”221
Would individuals still have some expectation of privacy despite having full
knowledge that their location information is being recorded and stored?222
Answering Justice Alito’s question only further contradicts the third-party
doctrine.
Just as the Supreme Court instructed of the third-party doctrine in Miller, it should overrule its faulty application.223 Society expects that a privacy
interest attaches to bank records and phone records. While the Court protects
historical cell-site location information that is observable by the naked eye,
it remains unclear why financial records stored on an app (or at a conventional bank) and hidden from the naked eye are less deserving of Fourth
Amendment protection. Adopting a digital third-party doctrine will not resolve the tension between the Fourth Amendment and technology, as it is a
direct departure from traditional expectations and proves unworkable. What
will prove workable, however, is adhering to the common understanding that
what enters the public—either through physical or digital information—remains public knowledge, and that which is public knowledge does not
amount to a reasonable expectation of privacy.

221. Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018)
(No. 16-402).
222. One solution to potentially resolving the uncertainties of the third-party doctrine is to
ask whether individuals have consented for third parties to share their information. Third-Party
Doctrine, supra note 32, at 588–90 (arguing that “the third-party doctrine is better understood as a
form of consent rather than as an application of Katz. Third-party disclosure eliminates privacy
because the target voluntarily consents to the disclosure, not because the target’s use of a third party
waives a reasonable expectation of privacy.”).
223. See generally Daniel Solove, 10 Reasons Why the Fourth Amendment Third Party
Doctrine Should Be Overruled in Carpenter v. US, TEACHPRIVACY (Nov. 28, 2017),
https://teachprivacy.com/carpenter-v-us-10-reasons-fourth-amendment-third-party-doctrine-overruled/ [https://perma.cc/7MJ2-J2VU] (explaining that the continued use of the third-party doctrine
will cause the Fourth Amendment to “become increasingly obsolete.”).
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V. WHAT ENTERS THE PUBLIC EYE REMAINS PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE:
“THE SUM OF AN INFINITE NUMBER OF ZERO-VALUE PARTS IS ALSO
ZERO.”224
The majority in Carpenter begins its quest to defend against law enforcement’s warrantless collection of historical cell-site location information
by reiterating that, “what [one] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”225 Carpenter
furthers its position by underscoring that “[a] person does not surrender all
Fourth Amendment protection by venturing into the public sphere.”226 At
the same time, the Supreme Court in Katz emphasized that “[w]hat a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”227 For this reason, the reasonable
expectation of privacy as to the visual observation of a person in public, as
concluded in Katz v. United States, is zero.228 The reasonable expectation of
privacy as to a person purchasing adult magazines in an adult bookstore is,
as concluded in Maryland v. Macon, zero.229 The reasonable expectation of
privacy as to a person’s movements on the highway is, as concluded in
Knotts v. United States, zero.230 The reasonable expectation of privacy as to
the aerial observation of a person’s property is, as concluded in California v.
Ciraolo and Florida v. Riley, zero.231 In each case, the Supreme Court spoke
to the privacy interests that attached to areas observable by the “intruding

224. United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, C.J., dissenting)
(noting that “[t]he reasonable expectation of privacy as to a person’s movements on the highway is
. . . zero,” and “the sum of an infinite number of zero-value parts is also zero.”).
225. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52
(1967)).
226. Id.
227. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
228. Id.
229. Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985).
230. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983).
231. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1986); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445,
449–50 (1989).
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eye.” 232 If Katz remains good law, and there is no indication to think otherwise, then Carpenter’s public location information could not have amounted
to a reasonable expectation of privacy because Carpenter was publicly exposed to nothing more than “intruding eye[s].”233 Instead of adhering to the
plain language of Katz, the majority in Carpenter supports its position by
revisiting two cases it decided over a decade after Katz.
The first case is United States v. Knotts.234 In Knotts, law enforcement
placed a radio transmitter inside a container that was sold to the suspect and
placed inside the vehicle driven by the suspect.235 Law enforcement followed the vehicle on public streets and on the highway.236 At some point,
law enforcement lost visual observation of the moving vehicle containing the
transmitter.237 But with the aid of a helicopter that picked up the transmitter’s signal, law enforcement found the location of the transmitter inside a
cabin.238 The Court concluded that “[a] person traveling in an automobile
on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements from one place to another.”239 The Court explained that when
the suspect traveled on public streets and highways, “he voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was traveling” from one
destination to another.240 Additionally, despite law enforcement losing visual surveillance of the vehicle, leaving technology as the only means of discovering the suspect’s final destination, “scientific enhancement of this sort
raises no constitutional issues which visual surveillance would not also

232. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
233. Id.
234. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276.
235. Id. at 277–78.
236. Id. at 281.
237. Id. at 278.
238. Id. at 278–79.
239. Id. at 281.
240. Id. at 281–82.
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raise.”241 Law enforcement merely identified what they would have identified had they not temporarily lost visual contact with the vehicle.242 Accordingly, the Court held that an expectation of privacy did not extend to the
visual observation of the suspect’s travels in public.243 Left responding to
the possibility that individuals could be subject to “twenty-four hour surveillance” by law enforcement, the Court noted that “if such dragnet-type law
enforcement practices” occur, a different ruling may give way.244 Three decades after Knotts, the Court revisited the possibility of a “dragnet-type” surveillance using GPS tracking devices in United States v. Jones.245
In United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court similarly considered the
constitutionality of tracking a vehicle’s public movements with the use of
technology.246 Unlike the technological use of a beeper concealed in a container and sold to the suspect in Knotts, law enforcement in Jones physically
installed a GPS tracking device underneath the suspect’s vehicle.247 The
Court found that the installation of the tracking device, for the purpose of
obtaining information, constituted a trespassory search under the Fourth
Amendment.248 Although law enforcement violated the Fourth Amendment,
the majority stressed that it did not violate Jones’s reasonable expectation of
privacy under existing law.249 This is because the “mere observation” of a
vehicle traveling in public does not amount to a reasonable expectation of

241. Id. at 285 (noting that the radio transmitter was not used “in any way that would not
have been visible to the naked eye from outside the cabin.”).
242. Id. (explaining that “[a] police car following . . . [the suspect] at a distance throughout
his journey could have observed him leaving the public highway and arriving at the cabin” with the
transmitter still in the vehicle).
243. Id. at 281–82.
244. Id. at 283–84. (citation omitted).
245. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 408–09 (2012).
246. Id. at 402.
247. Id. at 402–03.
248. Id. at 404.
249. Id. at 408–09 (noting that “the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been
added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”).
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privacy since that location information is observable by the “public eye.”250
The concurring justices, however, emphasized that irrespective of “the presence or absence of a physical intrusion,” a Katz analysis may be warranted.251
One reason for this additional analysis is that the length of law enforcement
surveillance could violate the reasonable privacy expectations that individuals expect in public.252 Justice Alito expressed that “relatively short-term
monitoring of a person’s movements on public streets accords with expectations of privacy that our society has recognized as reasonable,” but goes on
to say that “the line was surely crossed” when that monitoring continued for
four weeks.253 On a similar point, Justice Sotomayor questioned whether
society “expect[s] that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in
a manner that enables the government” to collect personal information.254
Justice Sotomayor also expressed concern towards the means of law enforcement surveillance.255 Specifically, the use of technology versus conventional
surveillance, like physically following a vehicle or viewing footage from a
nearby camera poll.256 Not only is technology cheaper than conventional
techniques,257 but when the government employs technology to surveil individuals, the subject of the surveillance likely does not know he is being monitored.258 The odds of a suspect catching wind of having a tail by an interviewed witness or the distinct unmarked vehicle in the rear-view mirror is
greater than if law enforcement employed technology.
250. Id. at 411–12 (citation omitted) (explaining that “[t]his Court has to date not deviated
from the understanding that mere visual observation does not constitute a search.”).
251. Id. at 414–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 422–23 (Alito, J., concurring in judgement).
252. See, e.g., id. at 409 (majority opinion); id. at 424–25 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
253. Id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
254. Id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
255. Id. at 415–16.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 429–30 (Alito, concurring in judgment) (explaining that conventional circumstances may require “a large team of agents, multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial surveillance,”
whereas “monitoring [an individual using technology is] relatively easy and cheap.”).
258. Id. at 415–16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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Writing for the majority in Jones, Justice Scalia recognized the foreseeable problems attached to differentiating between long-term and shortterm surveillance: “[I]t remains unexplained why a 4-week investigation is
‘surely’ too long . . . . What of a 2-day monitoring of a suspected purveyor
of stolen electronics? Or of a 6-month monitoring of a suspected terrorist?”259 The majority in Jones declined to use Katz’ reasonable expectations
of privacy test, and instead stressed that it would be “particularly vexing” to
determine that the amount of days, weeks, months, or even years of public
observation is either too long or short, especially when considering “such
surveillance is constitutionally permissible.”260

A. Assessing the Length of Surveillance Cannot Survive Under a
Practical Application
It is entirely unclear what the implications would be of a Fourth
Amendment that protects cumulative data collected by law enforcement.
The Supreme Court explains that longer periods of police surveillance reveal
information that, taken together, creates a revealing image of an individual,
otherwise known as a “mosaic.”261 But this proposition is nothing more than
“extravagant generalizations,” which the same Court has “never held that
potential, as opposed to actual, invasions of privacy constitute searches for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment.”262 By this logic, any length of surveillance by law enforcement could run afoul of the Fourth Amendment based
solely on the amount of information collected. The Supreme Court assumes
that the compilation of information logically amounts to a wealth of private
information.
Distinguishing between long-term and short-term surveillances takes
for granted many things. The first is that only long-term surveillances reveal
(1) quantitatively more information and (2) qualitative information. Even a
single day of surveillance can reveal more about an individual than a weeklong surveillance, which proves that no amount of days of surveillance auto-

259. Id. at 412–13 (majority opinion) (citation omitted).
260. Id.
261. See id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (asking “whether people reasonably expect
that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the government to
ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”).
262. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 n.5 (1986).
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matically produces a revealing “mosaic.” Second, police might obtain actionable information of an individual on day ten of their surveillance, while
observing little to no information on the first nine days. Third, the Court
confuses possibility with certainty. Surveilling an individual for ten days
could reveal nothing more than where the individual eats, which hardly
amounts to a revealing “mosaic” envisioned by the Court. Fourth, law enforcement is not equipped with a crystal ball informing them as to when their
collection of information implicates the Fourth Amendment. Fifth, how
much information actually creates a “mosaic”? Under the mosaic theory, the
collection of information would inevitably turn into a Fourth Amendment
search at some undefined point, making the mosaic theory’s application impracticable.263
A simple example might help bring some of these points to life. Suppose law enforcement monitored an individual for ten days. In those ten
days, law enforcement employs physical surveillance, directing undercover
officers to follow the individual each time he travels in public. Of the ten
days, the individual leaves his residence and enters the public on three separate days. Of the three days the individual was in public, he was alone. The
individual went to his local gym, a local restaurant, and a local grocery store.
Finally, after ten days, law enforcement has uncovered: where the individual
exercises, including the name of the gym and perhaps the various exercises
the individual does; where the individual likes to eat, including the name of
the restaurant and type of food the individual eats; and where the individual
shops for groceries, including the name of the grocery store and the various
groceries purchased. Now to rewind. Assume now law enforcement conduct
a three-day surveillance. The individual leaves his house twice, again alone,
and enters the public sphere. On the first day, the individual drives to another
residence that law enforcement identified as the home of the individual’s
parents. The individual picks up his parents and takes them to a local mosque
to pray. On the second day, the individual goes shopping at a nearby shopping mall, only this time the individual is with his significant other. After
shopping, undercover officers observe three different shopping bags that the
individual carried: one from Victoria’s Secret; another from Rifles & Ammunition; and the third bag from Kids-R-Us.
Between the former and latter suspect, law enforcement undoubtedly
uncovered more about the latter suspect who was monitored for only three
days, as opposed to the former suspect who was monitored for ten days. This

263. Kerr, supra note 68, at 330–33 (explaining the uncertainty created under the mosaic
theory as to when in the course of a surveillance a search occurs).
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is but one example demonstrating the impracticability of assessing the length
of law enforcement surveillance to conclude that a “mosaic” is consequently
revealed. The mosaic theory can best be understood as a puzzle piece.
Tasked with piecing together a disassembled 500-piece puzzle without
knowing that the puzzle collectively forms the image of a colored black hole,
it could take days, weeks, or months to uncover that the image is actually of
a black hole. But it is the process of individually piecing together the puzzle
that an individual learns of the shape, color, and measurements of the colored
black hole. The collection of this information reveals more about the black
hole image than does when the individual obtained the dissembled puzzle
piece. At the outset, an individual may have deduced that the puzzle includes
a distinct violet color, but it is through the continuous piecing together that
the individual collects more information about the black hole, a revealing
mosaic.
Returning back to law enforcement surveillance, one problem with the
Court’s adoption of the “mosaic theory” is that there is simply no practical
way of measuring how much information becomes too much information,
and just how long of a surveillance reveals too much information.264 The
answer, unfortunately, is not located in a dusty textbook or in a Supreme
Court opinion. One reason for this absence, perhaps, is because there is no
clear answer. How long law enforcement conducts surveillance is not determinative of how much information law enforcement collects. Likewise, how
much information law enforcement collects is not determinative of how long
law enforcement conducts surveillance. To continue assessing the length of
surveillance is to contribute to the unworkable mosaic theory that should be
overruled once and for all. With the inclusion of the length of government
surveillance into the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement could run afoul
of the Fourth Amendment even when they use ordinary investigatory techniques, such as using physical surveillance for a short period of time on individuals in public, or collecting footage from a nearby camera poll.

B. Assessing the Length of Surveillance is Incompatible with Katz
It is unclear how Katz could continue to survive when the length of
public observation is now factored into the expectations of privacy test. The
majority in Carpenter, while incorporating the concurring opinion in Jones,
emphasized that the length of government surveillance, “regardless whether

264. When Does a Carpenter Search Start—and When Does It Stop?, supra note 72.
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those movements were disclosed to the public at large,”265 matters in the
context of what privacy rights society expects to maintain in public. If physically surveilling a suspect in public can implicate the Fourth Amendment,
what is left of the public exposure doctrine?266 A retreat from the public
exposure doctrine is a direct retreat from Katz itself, for the simple reason
that Katz already decided the privacy concerns of individuals that inject
themselves in the public eye. Short of explicitly mentioning “public exposure doctrine,” the doctrinal rule was implicit in Katz’ expectations of privacy test.267 What Katz “sought to exclude when he entered the booth was
not the intruding eye—it was the uninvited ear.”268 Therefore, Katz does not
protect against the visual observations in public, so “[i]f there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a specific public movement, how can there be
any such expectation in a collection of these movements?”269
With respect to observing what was once public knowledge, as in Carpenter, Katz’ application does not change. What once entered the public eye
remains public knowledge. The question, then, is whether the public exposure doctrine applies only to contemporaneous observations or to past and
present observations. One scholar is convinced that the public exposure doctrine is limited to contemporaneous monitoring “at that time” the individual
was in public.270 Because past movements are not “susceptible to visual surveillance,” law enforcement could not use the public exposure doctrine with
retroactive force.271 Another scholar insists that the collection of historical

265. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2215 (2018).
266. Monu Bedi, Social Networks, Government Surveillance, and the Fourth Amendment
Mosaic Theory, 94 B.U. L.J. 1809, 1843–45 (2014) (expressing uncertainty as to the continued use
of the public exposure doctrine now that the mosaic theory is applied).
267. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, C.J.,
dissenting).
268. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (emphasis added).
269. Bedi, supra note 266, at 1839–42 (explaining the conceptual difficulties in applying
the mosaic theory).
270. Monu Bedi, The Curious Case of Cell Phone Location Data: Fourth Amendment Doctrine Mash-Up, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 61, 73 (2015) [hereinafter Cell Phone Location Data & the
Fourth Amendment] (discussing historical cell-site location information in the context of the thirdparty doctrine and public exposure doctrine).
271. Id. at 73–74.
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cell-site location information, irrespective of whether the information concerns past movements, is analogous to “obtaining testimony from an eyewitness,” making the collection of public information, available for all to see,
lawful.272 The scholar adds that historical cell-site location information is
akin to non-content information necessary to establish communication, and
because observing non-content information does not implicate the Fourth
Amendment, neither should historical cell-site location information that does
not consist of protected content.273 Lower courts have also held that historical cell-site location information is subject to the public exposure doctrine
and therefore does not violate the Fourth Amendment.274 Limiting the public
exposure doctrine to only contemporaneous observations is to say that the
information conveyed to the public on any given day is forgotten the moment
an individual exits the public sphere. Suppose a friend invites you to a barbeque. At the barbeque, another friend approaches you and mentions seeing
you at Costco last week. Using this very simple example, Katz teaches us
that what becomes public knowledge remains public knowledge. The same
is true in the digital arena.275 If a drunk tweet is posted onto Twitter, deleting
the tweet the next morning does not mean the information contained in the
tweet will not resurface a day, week, month, or even year later.
The answer to observing historical information, including movements
that generate cell-site location information, lies at the heart of Katz. The
expectations of privacy test was designed to protect that which is deliberately
concealed from the government, not that which is clearly exposed to the curious.276 Public visual surveillance should not, and under Katz could not,

272. Brief of Professor Orin S. Kerr at 3–7, as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent,
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402).
273. Fourth Amendment & the Internet, supra note 28, at 1009–11, 1017–22.
274. See, e.g., In re United States for an Order Directing Provider of Elec. Commun. Serv.
To Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 312–13 (3d Cir. 2010).
275. See, e.g., United States v. Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d 523, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (explaining that the moment the individual shared information on Facebook, that individual’s “legitimate expectation of privacy ended.”); see, e.g., United States v. Gatson, No. 13–705, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 173588, at *60 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2014) (finding no legitimate expectation of privacy
in photos shared to Instagram).
276. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967); see also id. at 361 (Harlan,
J., concurring).
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implicate the Fourth Amendment.277 The Supreme Court’s continued assessment of the length of law enforcement surveillance is a direct departure from
the common practice of physical surveillance.278 For this reason, to hold
otherwise is unprecedented and will prove unworkable.

C. Using Technology to Obtain What is Publicly Observable is
Consistent With Katz
Using technology to obtain what is already public knowledge is permissible. For example, law enforcement routinely obtains information on
drivers in public by recording their license plate information with mobile
data terminals that are equipped in most patrol vehicles.279 Since license
plates are publicly displayed, “[t]hey are there for all the world to see, including the world of law enforcement.”280 The Supreme Court has similarly
spoken on this issue in New York v. Class, where the Court emphasized that
“[t]he exterior of a car, of course, is thrust into the public eye, and thus to
examine it does not constitute a “‘search.’”281 Although Class dealt with a
vehicle identification number rather than a license plate number, lower
courts insist that Class “applies with equal force to license plates.”282
277. Compare Kerr, supra note 68, at 335 (questioning whether “visual surveillance
[should] be subject to” the Fourth Amendment), with Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 757
(1993) (advocating that visual surveillance should be subject to the Fourth Amendment).
278. See David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A Shattered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls and
Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 14 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 381, 403–05
(2013) (noting that visual surveillance is “commonplace” and widely accepted).
279. See, e.g., United States v. Ellison, 462 F.3d 557, 565 n.2 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Darlene Cedrés, Mobile Data Terminals and Random License Plate Checks: The Need for Uniform
Guidelines and a Reasonable Suspicion Requirement, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 391,
395–97 (1997) (explaining that “[a] mobile data terminal (‘MDT’) is a ‘remote portable computer’
that ‘enables the transmission of data between the MDT and a host computer system,’ allowing the
police access to a multitude of information about a vehicle and its owner by entering in the vehicle’s
license-plate number.”)).
280. State v. Myrick, 282 N.J. Super. 285, 293 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).
281. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114 (1986) (explaining that “it is unreasonable to
have an expectation of privacy in an object required by law to be located in a place ordinarily in
plain view from the exterior of the automobile.”).
282. See, e.g., Ellison, 462 F.3d at 561 (holding that “an automobile’s Vehicle Identification Number, located inside the passenger compartment, but visible from outside the car, does not
receive Fourth Amendment protection.”); United States v. Walraven, 892 F.2d 972, 974 (10th Cir.
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The technology used in Carpenter, namely the data gathered and stored
by wireless providers, “merely captured information” that Carpenter had already “exposed to the public.”283 Consequently, as the Court explained in
Knotts, the use of technology merely enhances law enforcement’s ability to
obtain information that could have been obtained by public observation,284
and the use of technology to obtain this information does not violate the expectations of privacy test.285 The same ruling should have applied in Carpenter. According to the majority in Carpenter, “the retrospective quality of
the data here gives police access to a category of information otherwise unknowable.”286 But law enforcement obtained information on Carpenter’s
public whereabouts that was otherwise knowable through traditional investigatory surveillance methods. For example, if law enforcement physically
surveilled Carpenter, law enforcement would have had first-hand knowledge
of Carpenter’s location in public. If law enforcement obtained video footage
of nearby shops, the footage may have revealed Carpenter’s location in public. Had there been camera polls affixed in the surrounding area, and law
enforcement reviewed them, Carpenter’s location in public could have been
revealed. Such options are but a few examples of the many ways that law

1989) (holding that because license plates “are in plain view, no privacy interest exists in license
plates.”); Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 529 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that “[a]
motorist has no privacy interest in her license plate number.”).
283. See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 213 Cal. App. 4th 743, 757–58 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (finding
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the historic speed and braking data taken from the vehicle’s
sensing diagnostic module because “others could observe [the] vehicle’s movements, braking, and
speed, either directly or through the use of technology such as radar guns or automated cameras,”
and the “technology merely captured information . . . knowingly exposed to the public[.]”); Mobley
v. State, 346 Ga. App. 641, 646 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy
in the data obtained by the vehicle’s airbag control module, like the historical data of a vehicle’s
speed, “because individuals knowingly expose such information to the public. While an outside
observer cannot ascertain the information regarding the use and functioning of a vehicle with the
same level of precision as that captured by the ACM, there are outward manifestations of the functioning of some of the vehicle’s systems when a vehicle is operated on public roads. For example,
a member of the public can observe a vehicle’s approximate speed; observe whether a vehicle’s
brakes are being employed by seeing the vehicle slow down or stop or the brake lights come on, by
hearing the sounds of sudden braking; and observe whether the driver is wearing a seatbelt.”).
284. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (explaining that “[a] police car following [the suspect] at a distance throughout his journey could have observed him.”).
285. Id. at 282, 285.
286. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018).
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enforcement could have obtained Carpenter’s location history, thereby making his location history knowable. Simply put, Carpenter’s ruling should
have read that “technology merely captured information . . . knowingly exposed to the public[.]”287 Whether the information concerned the historical
data of a vehicle’s speed,288 or the historical cell-site location information,
the same conclusion would be reached: individuals lack an expectation of
privacy in their public location information. As the dissent indicated in
United States v. Jones,289 “[t]he sum of an infinite number of zero-value parts
is also zero.”290

VI. CONCLUSION
“What is left of the Fourth Amendment?”291 The digital era we live in
today allows society to work, shop, socialize, and even monitor one’s health
without having to leave the confines of one’s home. With physical information becoming increasingly digitized, to what extent can the third-party
doctrine remain viable? It seems clear that as society becomes increasingly
dependent on third parties, the more at-risk society is in having their identity
recorded and stored indefinitely. While the use of third parties may be necessary to keep up with “modern society,”292 determining the reasonable expectations of privacy in shared information is best suited under the public
exposure doctrine.
The best solution is to get rid of the “ill suited”293 third-party doctrine,
and instead adhere to Katz’ public exposure doctrine formula. The lessons
of Carpenter encourage the active participation with the rest of society beyond the four corners of a home. The Court incentivizes individuals to enter
the public sphere with some amount of comfort in knowing that law enforcement may have to alter their surveillance practices in order to observe an

287. Diaz, 213 Cal. App. at 757–58.
288. See Mobley, 346 Ga. App. at 646.
289. United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
290. Id.
291. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2262 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
292. Id. at 2220 (majority opinion).
293. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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individual’s journey, for example, to Dodger Stadium. What enters the public, however, is public knowledge. For that reason, what becomes public
knowledge remains public knowledge. This common understanding does
not change in the eyes of physical information or digital information. The
expectation is not that parking in the doctor’s parking lot will be kept from
any passerby, including law enforcement; it is that the contents of the communication with the doctor will remain private. No amount of days, weeks,
or months observing an individual parking at the doctor’s parking lot would
reveal the intimate contents of the conversation, for it is the contents spoken
in a manner deliberately withheld from the public that society regards as reasonably shielded from public knowledge. Because “the sum of an infinite
number of zero-value parts is”294 zero, the mosaic theory should—and under
Katz must—be rejected. Until then, Carpenter will keep law enforcement
and “judges guessing for years to come.”295

294. Jones, 625 F.3d at 769.
295. Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 34 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Carpenter, 138
S. Ct. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the majority’s decision will result in
lower courts “guessing for years to come.”).

